En 2023 la editorial mexicana Gris Tormenta ha publicado la de la Ultima carta a un lector de Gerald Murnane, originalmente publicada dos años antes. Se trata de una compilación de más de una decena de ensayos en los que el autor revisa su trayectoria a través de sus libros para reflexionar entorno al ejercicio de la lectura y la creación y retomando temas como la creación literaria, el papel de la ficción en la vida del escritor y su relación (...) con sus editores, la escritura, la familia y el entorno. (shrink)

It was an empirical discovery that Phosphorus is Hesperus. According to Kripke, this was also the discovery of a necessary fact. Now, given Kripke’s theory of direct reference one could wonder what kind of discovery this is. For we already knew Phosphorus/Hesperus, and we also knew that any entity is, necessarily, identical to itself. So what is it that was discovered? I want to show that there is more to this widely known case than what usual readings, and critics, reveal; (...) and I want to show this under the Kripkean pattern that what was discovered is the plain fact of identity that Phosphorus is, and necessarily is, Hesperus. Moreover, I will show how both Kripkean theses, the necessity of identity and the direct theory of reference, should not be kept apart to understand the kind of discovery this is. In particular, understanding the kind of discovery we made will help us see how intuition is displayed in metaphysics, and how metaphysical impossibilities, and metaphysical modality in general, can be discerned by reason and separated from other modalities. The study of this discovery will help us see, in a line, how identity belongs to the inner and most profound structure of reality and to the most profound structure of cognition and language. (shrink)

In this paper I consider the possibility of a kind of a priori cognition that serves the purposes of metaphysics, given that metaphysics involves the search for modal knowledge. Necessary or, better, modal knowledge is a priori; so metaphysical knowledge is likewise a priori. Here I argue that intuition is the route to modal knowledge in metaphysics, and I insist that conceivability or knowledge of conceptual truths does not lead towards the modal realm of metaphysics.

The aim of the present paper is to attack some of the conceptual problems that arise when the framework of mathematical learning theory is applied to the description of the behavior of the firm, in setting prices and production quotas, in a competitive market. The goal is to depict the process by which the firm fixes prices and production quotas as a stochastic learning process. A solution to such problems is proposed which is based on statistical-decision concepts. The conceptualization of (...) the behavior of the firm by means of concepts pertaining to mathematical learning theory gives rise to certain mathematical problems, which are formulated here in rather precise terms. (shrink)

Transference theorists propose to explain causation in terms of the transference of a physical element. I argue, in two steps, that this is not possible. First, I show that available accounts of ‘transference’ ultimately convey that transference -and, consequently, causation- is the (non-relational) identity over time of the transferred element (a universal, a trope, or even an absolute substance). But, second, I try to defend, it is conceptually impossible that causation is (non-relational) identity.

I argue that the fundamental dogma that all necessary relations are internal is ungrounded. To motivate my argument, I analyse Moore’s classic ideas on internal relations and take them as an illustration of the common form of reasoning that can mislead us to conclude that all necessary relations are internal. That reasoning illicitly smuggles the idea that necessary properties and relations reflect on identity—in the sense that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of identity—into the separate idea (...) that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of essence. Essence, however, is not identity. So the way seems to be open for the existence of necessary properties/relations which do not belong to the essence of entities; that is, the existence of necessary but external relations. I then offer some examples of such relations. (shrink)

Este artículo defiende que toda acción es un suceso que entraña, responsabilidad agente. Toda acción es el suceso que es el "hacer" de alguien. La responsabilidad del agente que define una acción es el tipo que justifica el premio-castigo. Esto implica que la acción es, en todos los casos, revocable y socialmente sancionada, igual que lo es la responsabilidad que la define. Más aún, si la identidad personal se ha de comprender dentro del reino de la acción, las teorías de (...) corte narrativo, más que las aproximaciones mentalistas, se encuentran mucho mejor posicionadas para llevar a cabo esta labor de comprensión.Este artículo defiende que toda acción es un suceso que entraña, responsabilidad agente. Toda acción es el suceso que es el "hacer" de alguien. La responsabilidad del agente que define una acción es el tipo que justifica el premio-castigo. Esto implica que la acción es, en todos los casos, revocable y socialmente sancionada, igual que lo es la responsabilidad que la define. Más aún, si la identidad personal se ha de comprender dentro del reino de la acción, las teorías de corte narrativo, más que las aproximaciones mentalistas, se encuentran mucho mejor posicionadas para llevar a cabo esta labor de comprensión.This paper argues that an action is an event that essentially conveysagent responsibility. Any action is the event that is someone’s doing. Andagent responsibility, which defines action, is the kind of responsibility that justifiesreward and punishment. This means that action is, in all cases, defeasileand socially santioned, such as it is the type of responsibility that defines action.Moreover, if pesonal identity is to be understood within the frame ofaction, narrativist kind of theories, rather than mentalist approaches, are in amuch better position to do the job. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to provide a logical reconstruction of the Marxian Theory of Value. This reconstruction is based upon the concept of abstract as opposed to that of homogeneous labor. Abstract labour is a social relation that holds in a market economy, (at least) whenever the profit rate is uniform; it consists in a comparison of the different labors through the exchange relationship. The author proved in a different place (see García de la Sienra, 1987) (...) that there exists a mathematical representation of abstract labor which is unique up to similarity transformations. The existence of this function — which is none other than the value function — is the basis of the present axiomatization, which includes detailed reconstructions of two of the most important models of the theory. (shrink)

Preface to the thematic volume Metatheoretical Structuralism: Some Recent Developments and Applications.

In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism Russell held the view that facts in the world are formally structured complexes, the structure of which matches the logical structure of correspondent propositions. Russell also seems to have denied that there are facts of identity and of diversity. This paper argues that Identity and Diversity can be understood as purely formal structures in Russellian facts. It considers Russell’s possible reasons for denying the existence of facts of identity and diversity and shows how problematic (...) these reasons are. In particular, I argue that identity statements are not tautologies, and their denial does not result into a contradiction. An important consequence of this thesis is that Metaphysics and Logic are not as tied up as Russell took them to be, but nevertheless these are good news for the old formal program for Metaphysics that lies at the very heart of what he called philosophical logic. (shrink)

En este artículo pretendo la clarificación conceptual de la idea de propiedad individual. En concreto, defiendo que las propiedades individuales no son compuestos, aunque son naturalezas individuales complejas. Por un lado, no poseen un parte "individuante" que dé cuenta de sus condiciones de individualización: las propiedades individuales tienen su propia identidad numérica primitiva. Por otro lado, no poseen un parte "común," "universalizante" que dé cuenta de su naturaleza: las propiedades individuales son naturalezas individuales. Más aún, la creencia injustificada en que (...) toda naturaleza ha de ser universal, o de algún modo común, está detrás de la falsa necesidad de fundamentar la individualización de las propiedades individuales. (shrink)

This monographic issue contains a long article bringing together the Lullius Lectures delivered by Professor Sandra Mitchell during the Xth Conference of the Society of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science in Spain, that took place in Salamanca (16-19 November, 2021). The publication of her Lectures is complemented by six original articles that address and examine different aspects of Sandra Mitchell’s contributions to the philosophy of science. In this introduction to the monograph, the editors present the broad outlines of the (...) Lullius Lectures given by Mitchell on the landscape of integrative pluralism. We accompany this overview with a review of some of the fundamental concepts of her philosophy as reviewed and discussed by the original articles included in the monograph on integrative pluralism (Deulofeu & Suárez, 2023; and Van Der Merwe, 2023), emergence (Onnis, 2023), scientific laws (Andersen, 2023; and Plutynski, 2023), and realism (Bertolaso & Sterpetti, 2023). (shrink)

The absence of a necessary connection in singular causation is a key step in the Humean argument against any form of necessity in causation. I argue that Hume's defence of this step is unsuccessful, and that the step could be skipped, accepting the possibility of necessary a posteriori truths. Still this does not suffice to guarantee a necessary connection in singular causation. Necessary a posteriori truths should be backed by necessary a priori truths. Thus, a main object of this paper (...) is to argue that an a priori philosophical concept of causality involves a necessary connection between its terms. (shrink)

After presenting a brief history of philosophy in Hispanic-America since the XVI century, we discuss whether the idea of province and empire is applicable to contemporary Hispanic-American philosophy, investigate the form these ideas adopt in this region, and inquire into the ways in which provincialism i s present in philosophical work. We conclude that there are three main groups that understand their peripheral position in different ways, with different views on the way in which they should insert into the mainstream (...) of Western philosophy. (shrink)

Tropes, as distinguished from other possible kinds of entities such as universals, states of affairs, events and bare particulars, are best-suited to play the role of causal relata.

This article argues for two related theses. First, it defends a general thesis: any kind of necessity, including metaphysical necessity, can only be known a priori. Second, however, it also argues that the sort of a priori involved in modal metaphysical knowledge is not related to imagination or any sort of so-called epistemic possibility. Imagination is neither a proof of possibility nor a limit to necessity. Rather, modal metaphysical knowledge is built on intuition of philosophical categories and the structures they (...) form. (shrink)

Is singular causation best understood within a dispositionalist framework? Although a positive answer has not yet been wholly developed, different philosophers have made some positive contributions suggesting that it is. Against these suggestions, I claim that any possible account of singular causation in terms of real, irreducible, dispositions conveys unsolvable flaws in its very metaphysical foundations.

I argue that transference is, ultimately, identity over time, and that identity over time can't possibly be causation. Transference, then, fails as an analysis of causation.

I want to make sense of the view that singular causation involves a metaphysical necessary connection. By this I understand, where A and B are particulars, that ifA causes B then in every possible world in which A (or an A-indiscernible) or B (or a B-indiscernible) occurs, A (or an Aindiscernible) and B (or a B-indiscernible) occur. In the singularist approach that I will favour causal facts do not supervene on laws, causal relata are best understood as tropes, causation is (...) founded on the nature of its terms, and the necessity thus involved does not entail essentialism, determinism, and other usual problems. (shrink)

Vaidya and Wallner [2021] claim that most relevant theories in recent epistemology of modality, that is, Conceivability-Theory, Counterfactual-Theory, and Deduction-Theory, face what they name “the problem of modal epistemic friction”, in a nutshell, the need to add some relevant information about the nature of the world that is not provided by the theories as such. Their proposal is that essences supply the needed information. In this paper I will agree with Vaidya and Waller’s detection of the problem of modal epistemic (...) friction, but I will importantly disagree with their solution in terms of a metaphysics and epistemology of essences. I will argue that knowledge of essence is neither necessary nor sufficient for metaphysical modal knowledge and claim instead that modal knowledge is firstly grounded in the categories that conform the facts of reality. Categorial knowledge does the job of creating the friction needed in all cases of modal metaphysical knowledge.Moreover, given the structural character of metaphysical categories, intuition is the basic proper form of modal knowledge. In fact, I will contend that intuition is the source of a priori knowledge invoked in Kripkean schemas for a posteriori modal truths. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article examine l'argumentation de Sullivan en faveur du principe que toute chose a une cause. On soutient que les critiques de Smith et d'Allen ne lui rendent pas justice et que Sullivan est justifié de maintenir que nous n'avons pas de bonnes raisons de nier la vérité de ce principe. Sa défense finale, cependant, qui semble basée sur une approche thomiste, échoue. Être contingent et être causé sont séparables. Il semble au bout du compte que nous n'ayons pas (...) non plus de bonnes raisons de nier la fausseté du principe en question. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to offer a conception of singular causality that lies between two main views in the literature, which I take to be paradigmatically represented by David Armstrong (1997) and by Michael Tooley (1987, 1990) respectively. Armstrong maintains that there is singular causation wherever there are singular facts that instantiate causal laws; these facts are otherwise independent regularities. Tooley maintains that singular causation is independent of causal laws together with any other non-causal fact. My own view (...) is that Armstrong’s account is too weak to conform a singularist position, as in his view singular causal relations are finally dependent on universal causation. On the other hand, Tooley’s account is too strong to be causal, as causation dissolves into a purely external and mysterious connection that is not even Humean -not even regularities play a role in its establishment. I want to maintain that there exists a middle way that correctly characterizes the spirit of singular causation, and that can be stated by (CS): (CS) Singular causality is metaphysically independent of universal causality. Neither Tooley nor Armstrong would admit (CS) as an appropriate defining thesis for causal singularism. In what follows, I consider different causal situations existing in the literature, with the purpose of analysing singular causation, arguing against Tooley and Armstrong's views, and defending (CS) instead. If my reasons are accepted, Armstrong’s position, rather than being singular in spirit, results into a form of causal universalism. I will also reject Tooley’s singularism as an extreme counterintuitive form of hyperrealism. Some consequences for causation are immediate. In particular, that singular causal relations are tropes, i.e., individual relations. (shrink)

La finalidad de este artículo es proveer una reconstrucción lógica del elemento teórico básico de la teoría del valor trabajo desde la perspectiva de la metateoría estructuralista. Las metas son esbozar con alguna precisión la ley fundamental de la teoría �la ley del valor� así como la aserción empírica.

The aim of the present paper is to provide a logical reconstruction of the Marxian Theory of Value. This reconstruction is based upon the concept of abstract as opposed to that of homogeneous labor.labour is a social relation that holds in a market economy, whenever the profit rate is uniform; it consists in a comparison of the different labors through the exchange relationship. The author proved in a different place that there exists a mathematical representation of abstract labor which is (...) unique up to similarity transformations. The existence of this function -- which is none other than the value function -- is the basis of the present axiomatization, which includes detailed reconstructions of two of the most important models of the theory. (shrink)

Economists have long grappled with the problem of how economic theories relate to empirical evidence: how can abstract mathematized theories be used to produce empirical claims? How are such theories applied to economic phenomena? What does it mean to "test" economic theories? This book introduces, explains, and develops a structural philosophy of economics which addresses these questions and provides a unifying philosophical/logical basis for a general methodology of economics. The book begins by introducing a rigorous view of the logical foundations (...) and structure of scientific theories based upon the work of Alfred Tarski, Patrick Suppes, Karl Marx, and others. Using and combining their methods, the book then goes on to reconstruct important economic theories - including utility theory, game theory, Marxian economics, Sraffian economic theory, and econometrics - proving all the main theorems and discussing the key claims and the empirical applicability of each theory. Through these discussions, this book presents, in a systematic fashion, a general philosophy of economics grounded in the structural view. Offering rigorous formulations of important economic theories, A Structuralist Theory of Economics will be invaluable to all readers interested in the logic, philosophy, and methodology of economics. It will also appeal particularly to those interested in economic theory. (shrink)

Even though Patrick Suppes made important contributions to utility theory, his final views on economic choice are quite critical of the expected-utility theories of rational choice. The aim of the present paper is to expose in a unified way his final views on economic choice and freedom. These views are part of his conception of causality and rationality.

Secular Humanism has been unable to provide an adequate foundation for public ethics and has been destructive of those faith communities on which it depends for its very existence. Thus, what is required is a new political system, based on religious freedom and a dialogue which includes all these communities, that prevents such destruction and is able to provide a convincing public ethics.

The transformations that take place in the realm of high-energy physics, as well as the fact that reality appears to the distinct sciences as a stockpile of layers of laws and properties, seem to support an Aristotelian view of matter. This makes both interesting and relevant a fresh reconsideration of one of the most systematic formulations of such a view: that of Francis Suarez in his Metaphysical Disputations. This formulation is introduced here in a more contemporary language and from the (...) vantage point of three centuries of modern physics. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to attack some of the conceptual problems that arise when the framework of mathematical learning theory is applied to the description of the behavior of the firm, in setting prices and production quotas, in a competitive market. The goal is to depict the process by which the firm fixes prices and production quotas as a stochastic learning process. A solution to such problems is proposed which is based on statistical-decision concepts. The conceptualization of (...) the behavior of the firm by means of concepts pertaining to mathematical learning theory gives rise to certain mathematical problems, which are formulated here in rather precise terms. (shrink)

Aunque las contribuciones de Patrick Suppes en el ámbito de la lógica, la metodología y la losofía de la economía (por no mencionar a la propia economía) hayan sido importantes, los metodólogos de la economía apenas las conocen. El propósito de este artículo es cubrir este vacío. Presentaremos su concepción general de la losofía de la ciencia y analizaremos después con detalle su noción de modelos de datos, surgida de sus famosos experimentos sobre aprendizaje. Discutiremos también su concepción de la (...) medición fundamental en relación con tales experimentos. El artículo incluye además una amplia bibliografía de los trabajos de Suppes sobre el tema. (shrink)

Herman Dooyeweerd ( 1985 ) argued that among the modalities making up the fabric of reality a specifically economic one is to be found. The aim of the present paper is to discuss the texture of such a modality and how it both differentiates and intertwines with others. For an updated brief, albeit cogent and analytically lucid presentation of the Law Framework ontology, see Clouser ( 2009 ). Dooyeweerd’s view entails that the proper object of economics is irreducible to that (...) of other disciplines, but a non-reductionist view of the object of economics presupposes that the nuclear meaning of that discipline has been clearly delimited: this is required in order to determine its nature and separate identity as a scientific discipline. By ‘the nuclear meaning of a discipline’ I understand a pre-theoretical delimitation of its field of research, such as that of the field of physics, characterized by the laws governing force and energy. Within one and the same field there may be many theories, theories competing to explain the same phenomena, or dealing with phenomena so different that it is nearly impossible to trace conceptual connections among them. This last situation calls for a unified-field theory. In the second section of this paper I will attempt to defend a rather commonly accepted definition of the field of economics that sees this discipline as a science of choice. In the third I will show how the analytical conception it involves can be naturally complemented with a classificatory one. According to a classificatory conception, the aggregated social-level phenomena, patterns and regularities economic theories usually deal with, are economic in that sense, even though they are not prima facie cases of individual behavior, or are unintended consequences of aggregated individual choices. In the fourth I will discuss the meaning of the most general, supra-arbitrary economic laws—the modal laws of economics. In the final section I will offer a non-reductionist view of economics that nevertheless takes into account its intertwining with other spheres. (shrink)

The aim of the dissertation is to show that the logical foundations of the Marxian Theory of Value are reasonably sound. The first chapter presents a concise history of MTV and formulates in a detailed way the problem of foundations in MTV. This is the problem of proving the existence of labor-values in a general economy in which joint products, alternative techniques, and heterogeneous labor are allowed. ;In the second chapter the problem is tackled through the demonstration that there is (...) a measurement of abstract labor in such general systems, where abstract labor is understood as a binary relation over the set of labor expenditures induced by a system of prices, in a commodity economy, that satisfies certain properties. It is also shown that whenever the rate of profit is uniform the price system satisfies such properties. ;Using the results of the second chapter, in the last chapter an axiomatization of MTV is provided and two of the most typical models of MTV are reconstructed in terms of abstract labor in a very detailed way. The first of these is the classical Leontief model and the second one is a more general model due to John K. Roemer. The conclusion of the dissertation is that the foundations of MTV are as sound as those of Neo-classical Economics. (shrink)

Herman Dooyeweerd’s classical characterization of the meaning-kernel of the economic modality runs as follows:the sparing or frugal mode of administering scarce goods, implying an alternative choice of their destination with regard to thesatisfaction of different human needs.My first aim in this paper is to show that Dooyeweerd’s characterization of the meaning-kernel of the economic modality naturallyleads to neoclassical economic theory. In order to do this, I will provide an argument that, departing from Dooyeweerd’s definitionof the meaning-kernel of the economic modality, (...) concludes in a logical reconstruction of neoclassical economictheory . The fundamental law of this theory will turn out to be thus, naturally, a formulation of thefundamental modal law of economics. The second aim of the paper is epistemological since it discusses the methodological problem of the empirical claim of the theory. It is my hope that this discussion will clarify the limits of NET and provide a reply to the objections raised against it by Reformed scholars like Goudzwaard. (shrink)

"Center for the Study of Language and Information, Leland Stanford Junior University.".

Presentamos una serie de reflexiones sobre los compromisos del o de la terapeuta en las situaciones sociales generadas en el encuadre específico de los Grupos de Intervención sobre los Estados de Conciencia (GIEC). En el desarrollo de los GIEC se crea una cultura que actuará como herramienta terapéutica, y a la que la persona que ejerce como terapeuta debe estar atenta para que no se convierta en cultura enraizada que lleve a sus miembros a convertirse en lo que deben ser. (...) Lo importante es que dicha cultura mantenga una apertura a la posibilidad de explorar lugares disociados, tanto a nivel personal como social. En consecuencia, tal terapeuta se compromete con una manera concreta de entender las relaciones sociales desde la diversidad, apoyada por su conducta colaborativa y de apertura hacia la libertad propia y de quienes le rodean. Ese compromiso es posible interpretarlo como una posición ideológica básica que permitirá el desarrollo adecuado de los grupos. Sin embargo, nos preguntamos si sería posible interpretarla también como una postura ética. Para ello, nos basamos en el planteamiento de Emmanuel Levinas sobre la otredad, y desarrollamos sus implicaciones, beneficios y riesgos dentro del proceso de la terapia grupal. (shrink)